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A steady drumbeat of  bad economic news over the last few months clearly 
indicates that the economy is facing a recession, that is likely to rank among the 
worst of  the post-war downturns. The economy’s current weakness, and the 
likelihood that it will deteriorate rapidly in the near future, underline the need for 
crafting a substantial stimulus package as quickly as possible. While the Federal 
Reserve has been lowering interest rates in hopes of  stimulating the economy, the 
best way to forestall the worst-case scenario is to adopt an aggressive fiscal stimulus 
package. We propose a fiscal stimulus package equal to 1 percent of  GDP. This 
sum may not be sufficient to fully offset the sources of  weakness in the economy, 
but it will provide an important boost. If  the downturn proves to be deeper and 
more long-lasting than most economists now expect, this amount can be raised at a 
later date. 
 
The underlying source for the economy’s weakness is the collapse of  the housing 
market. The extraordinary run-up of  house prices since 1995 had been the main 
force propelling growth in the current business cycle. At its peak in 2006, the 
house-price bubble had generated more than $8 trillion in housing wealth 
compared to a scenario in which house prices had just followed their long-term 
trend.1 The unsustainable increase in house prices pushed residential construction 
to a record share of  GDP, but even more importantly for the economy, 
homeowners also rapidly spent their newly created housing wealth, fueling 
consumption and the broader economy, and leading the savings rate to fall to the 
lowest level since the beginning of  the Great Depression.  
 
These effects are now being felt in reverse. The record rate of construction led to 
enormous overbuilding. The nationwide vacancy rate for ownership units is more 
than 40 percent higher than the level reached in any prior housing slump.2 The 
inventories of unsold homes are at or near record levels. This has caused 
construction to plummet, with housing starts now down by more than 40 percent 
compared with 2005 levels. More importantly, the overbuilding has led to sharp 
declines in house prices over large areas of the country.  
* Eileen Appelbaum is the director of  the Center for Women and Work at Rutgers University, Dean Baker is the Co-Director 
and John Schmitt is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, DC.
                                                 
1 The impact of  the run-up in house prices on the economy is discussed more extensively in Baker (2007).  
2 Census Bureau, 2007. “Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, Historical Data” Table 7,  
   [http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/histtab7.html]. 
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The November data from the Case-Shiller house-price index showed prices nationwide falling at more than 
an 11.0 percent annual rate over the prior three months.3 This rate of  price decline will destroy more than 
$2 trillion of  housing wealth over the course of  a year. 
This rapid pace of  decline in house prices will cause the already record high rate of  foreclosures to rise 
further. Foreclosures will spread well beyond the subprime segment of  the mortgage market and into the 
prime segment, leading to much greater distress in the financial industry than it has experienced thus far. 
This decline in house prices will also sharply curtail consumption as tens of  millions of  homeowners will 
no longer have any equity against which to borrow. The Federal Reserve Board’s data for the fourth quarter 
is likely to show that, for the first time in history, the ratio of  homeowners’ equity to housing value will fall 
below 50 percent.4 
 
The evidence of  waning consumption is already apparent in data showing the weakest holiday shopping 
season since the last recession. In response to drooping demand, several major car manufacturers have 
already cutback projections for sales and production in 2008. With job growth now slowed to a trickle and 
wages no longer keeping pace with inflation, consumption is almost sure to be even slacker in the months 
ahead. 
 
The deterioration in housing is also having an impact on state and local governments, which depend 
heavily on construction related fees and property taxes. Revenue projections are being revised sharply 
downward. As a result, state and local governments will be forced to raise taxes and/or cut spending to 
balance their budgets, further weakening the economy. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities recently 
added up the projected shortfalls for 2009 budgets in 13 states at $23 billion.5 This figure will undoubtedly 
go much higher as more states realize revenue shortfalls and the size of  these shortfalls grows.   
 
With languishing residential construction, stagnating consumption, and weakening state and local 
government spending all acting as a drag on the economy, it is difficult to imagine how the economy can 
remain healthy. Non-residential construction now appears to be softening after a boom in 2006 and 2007,6 
and equipment investment is also stagnating. Net exports had provided some boost to the economy in the 
first three quarters of  2007, but over the last two months, they have turned flat. There is a limit to how 
rapidly foreign countries will allow U.S. exporters to gain shares of  their markets.  
 
The most important consequence of  this economic weakness is job loss. The 0.3 percentage point jump in 
unemployment in December is likely a sign of  further trouble in the months ahead. A jump in the 
unemployment rate of  this size almost never occurs outside of  a recession. The employment rate (the 
percentage of  the population that is working) shows an even bleaker picture. The share of  the population 
in work has fallen 0.7 percentage points from its peak in December of  2006, corresponding to a falloff  in 
employment of  more than 1.5 million people.7 
 
Many economists are now predicting a recession in 2008, which is very alarming since economists, contrary 
to their reputation as the "dismal scientists," actually are typically quite optimistic about the economy and 
almost never predict recessions. When they do, it must mean that the economy is in poor shape.  
                                                 
3  Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Index (20 city composite) 
[http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/0,0,0,0,1145923002722.html].  
4 Federal Reserve Board, Flow of  Funds, Table B100, Line 50 [http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf]. 
5  McNichol, E. and I. Lav, 2007. “13 States Face Total Budget Shortfall of  at Least $23 Billion in 2009; 11 Others Expect 
Budget Problems.” Washington, DC; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities [http://www.cbpp.org/12-18-07sfp.htm].  
6  The December employment report actually showed job loss in the non-residential construction sector.  
7 The decline in the employment rate is larger than the increase in the unemployment rate because some of  the people who lose 
jobs give up looking for work and therefore are not counted as being unemployed. While this decision can be voluntary, such 
a large increase in the number of  prime age workers who leave the labor market is almost certainly a reflection of  labor 
market weakness and workers’ belief  that acceptable work is not available. 
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TABLE 1  
Economic Forecasts for 2001 and 2002, as of December 2000 
 2001  2002  
 Projection Actual Projection Actual 
Unemployment 4.3% 4.8% 4.5% 5.8% 
GDP growth 3.1% 0.8% 3.4% 1.9% 
S&P500 (year-end) 1490 1145.0 1639.5 899.0 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
 
For example, every six months the Philadelphia branch of  the Federal Reserve Board conducts its 
“Livingston Survey,” of  31 leading economists.8 Table 1 shows the results for the survey done in 
December of  2000, just three months before the beginning of  the last recession. The consensus forecast 
of  leading economists --just three months before the onset of  the 2001 recession-- was for strong 
economic growth in both 2001 and 2002.9 The Blue Chip Economic Forecasters, a survey of  50 economic 
forecasters, also showed a consensus for solid growth in 2001, with the lowest projection from the group 
coming in at 2.8 percent. Actual growth in 2001 was 0.8 percent.10  
 
The official government forecasters were no more accurate in their predictions. In its January 2001 Budget 
and Economic Outlook, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected 2.4 percent year-over-year growth 
for 2001.11  At that time, the Office of  Management and Budget projected 3.3 percent growth for 2001 
(CBO, 2001 Table 2-5). . In short, the overwhelming majority of  economists completely failed to anticipate 
a recession in 2001 even as it was just about to begin.  
 
The extraordinary bias among economists against forecasting recessions (if  they were unbiased, we should 
expect economists’ forecasts to be roughly evenly distributed around actual growth) means that the recent 
spate of  recession predictions among economists is especially ominous. Given their bias, recession 
predictions by economists are probably best viewed as a lagging indicator, providing evidence that the 
economy is in fact already in a recession, rather than an assessment of  the economy’s future prospects.  
 
In assessing the need for stimulus, it is also important to keep in mind the asymmetric nature of  the risks. 
Right now, the U.S. economy is undoubtedly weak and operating below its capacity. There is little risk that a 
temporary stimulus equal to 1 percent of  GDP (approximately $140 billion) would overheat the economy. 
Since the proposed stimulus is temporary, the impact on the long-term budget situation will be modest. 
Even if  the stimulus increases GDP by just the actual amount of  increased spending and tax reductions 
(i.e. the multiplier is 1), the federal government can count on collecting roughly 20 percent of  the amount 
spent in additional tax revenues. This means that the net addition to the debt would be just over $110 
billion, an amount that is frequently less than the error in projecting the annual budget deficit. On the 
other hand, if  the economy falls into a recession, this package could generate close to 2 million jobs. The 
additional jobs will also provide a much greater sense of  security to millions of  workers who are not 
directly employed as a result of  the stimulus measure.  
 
                                                 
8 Federal Reserve Bank of  Philadelphia, 2000. “The Livingston Survey,” Philadelphia, PA: Federal Reserve Bank of  Philadelphia 
[http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/liv/livdec00.pdf]. 
9 The attacks of  September 11, 2001, do not explain the forecasters' failure to foresee the recession. According to the National 
Bureau of  Economic Research, the 2001 recession began in March 2001, six months before the attacks, and the recession 
ended in November 2001, just two months after the attacks. 
10 Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Vol. 25, No. 9, September 10, 2000, Table  2.  
11 Congressional Budget Office, 2001. Budget and Economic Outlook, 2002-2011, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget 
Office, Summary Table 3 [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/27xx/doc2727/entire-report.pdf].  
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The nature of  the impending recession means that Congress, as much as the Federal Reserve Board, will 
play a central role in turning the economy around. Ordinarily, the Federal Reserve Board could expect to 
give the economy a boost with interest rate cuts. However, it may be more reluctant to lower interest rates 
now than in prior recessions because of  concerns about inflation stemming from a falling dollar. More 
importantly, the main channel through which interest rates stimulate demand has been through the housing 
sector, as lower mortgage interest rates encouraged people to buy homes and also to borrow against their 
homes to support consumption. With an unprecedented accumulation of  unsold homes and lenders 
writing off  tens of  billions in mortgage debt, this channel for generating demand is unlikely to be effective 
in the current economic environment.  
 
Finally, the bursting of  the housing bubble has the potential to lead to a downward spiral, as happened in 
Japan in the early 1990s. An appropriately devised fiscal stimulus package could be an important force in 
sustaining the economy, giving Congress the time needed to plan stronger steps. 
 
Directing the Stimulus   
 
The stimulus program outlined here is a healthy, but limited,  start towards counteracting the effect of  the 
housing downturn on the economy. The package of  measures sums to approximately 1 percent of  GDP 
($140 billion):  $85 billion in tax cuts, $20 billion in tax credits for energy-conserving home and business 
improvements, $7 billion to subsidize use of  public transportation, $3 billion to subsidize the purchase of  
heating oil and gas for low- and moderate-income families, and an additional $25 billion for temporary 
revenue sharing for state and local governments. 
A Temporary Tax Cut for Every Worker 
The core of  this package is a one-time $600 tax cut for every worker. A temporary tax-cut of  this size is 
desirable both because it would be progressive and because it targets working families who are likely to 
spend the proceeds quickly, giving a speedy lift to the economy. Research on the 2001 tax cut showed that 
most of  that cut was spent shortly after it was received, especially by low- and moderate-income families.12 
Since consumers will spend a temporary tax cut when they receive it, there is no need to make a tax cut 
permanent, with the resulting permanent loss of  revenue. Running deficits during a downturn when the 
economy needs stimulus is good economics; when the economy recovers, however, it is important to 
maintain responsible budgets.  
 
We propose that the temporary tax cut be designed as a combination of  (1) a one-time rate reduction for 
those who have more than $600 in income-tax liability and (2) an Enhanced Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EEITC) for those with less than $600 in income-tax liability. The tax cut can be implemented by sending 
taxpayers and recipients of  the EITC a $600 check. 
 
We believe strongly that the tax reduction should focus on general tax revenues and not the payroll tax. 
First, such a tax cut benefits everyone who works or pays taxes. Second, we are concerned that providing 
even a one-time payroll-tax cut would reverse a 70-year-old policy that payroll taxes are tied exclusively to 
financing particular programs, most notably Social Security. Tapping payroll taxes to pay for a short-term 
stimulus plan would set a dangerous precedent that critics of  Social Security could use to undermine the 
program's long-term solvency. Finally, the administrative expertise already exists to have a rebate based on 
                                                 
12
 See Johnson, D., J. Parker, and N. Souleles, 2006. Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of  2001.“ American 
Economic Review 96 (December): 1589-1610. 
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the income tax since it has been done several times in the past, most recently in 2001. The mechanisms 
would have to be created from scratch to put in place a rebate or reduced payment for Social Security taxes. 
Setting up this structure could delay the stimulus by several months.  
 
Tax Credits Targeted Toward Housing Sector, Green Building 
The second part of  our stimulus package is a 30 to 40 percent tax credit to households or businesses for 
renovation and improvements that will substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This would extend 
and expand credits that were passed in the 2005 energy bill. The credit would apply to increased insulation, 
the installation of  solar paneling or windmills, or other improvements that reduce the use of  fossil fuels. 
The credit would have the benefit of  providing a large incentive to employ workers in construction, 
precisely the sector that has been most seriously hit by the downturn in the housing market. The credit can 
be limited to a modest amount (e.g. $2,500) which would minimize the opportunities for fraud and ensure 
that the benefits are widely spread among homeowners and small businesses. This program would also be 
an important start towards reducing the country’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
This tax-credit program is similar to the program that has been in place under the energy bill passed in 
2005. However, the credit would be considerably more generous than the 10 percent credit provided under 
that legislation. In addition, with housing construction sinking to its lowest levels in more than a decade, 
contractors are likely to have far more incentive to seek out business with this tax credit than they did at 
the peak of  the housing boom in 2005.  
 
Transit and Home Heating Tax Credits 
In the same vein, the package includes $7 billion in subsidies for mass transit which would take the form 
of  a one-time payment to mass transit systems to be used to reduce fares for riders for one year. Transit 
riders take approximately 10 billion trips a year on buses, light rail, commuter trains or other forms of  mass 
transit.13 If  these fares can be cut by an average of  70 cents per ride, this would directly put money in the 
pockets of  mass transit users. For someone who takes mass transit to and from work each day, this would 
amount to savings of  $350. This would provide a substantial incentive for commuters to try public 
transportation and at the same time put money directly in transit riders’ pockets. 
 
It should be possible to implement such a system of  temporary fare cuts in a relatively short period of  
time. Under this portion of  the package, the government would announce that it has $7 billion, available 
on a first-come first-serve basis, to mass-transit agencies that submit a specific plan to lower fares over the 
specified time period. The purpose of  the plan is first to lock in a commitment to lower fares, and second 
to ensure that the agencies have actually made a plan so that they will be able to accommodate the 
increased usage that would be associated with large fare cuts.  
 
Since agencies would be alerted to the prospect for increased funding as a bill is coming up for debate, they 
should be able to submit plans soon after any legislation is actually passed (2-4 weeks). The first-come first-
served standard ensures that any plans can be approved after minimal review. The point is to make sure 
that some thought has gone into accommodating increased usage, and that the numbers actually add up. It 
is not to determine whether a particular agency has come up with the best plan.  
 
The package also includes $3 billion to subsidize the purchase of  heating oil and fuel by low- and 
moderate-income families. This would more than double the current appropriation for the LIHEAP 
                                                 
13  American Public Transportation Association, 2006. “Historical Ridership Trends,” Washington, D.C: American Public 
Transportation Association [http://www.apta.com/research/stats/ridership/ridetrnd.cfm] 
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program and would limit cutbacks or even increase non-fuel purchases by families struggling with high oil 
and energy bills. This is a reasonable increase given both the jump in energy prices and the need to get 
money that can be spent on other consumption items into people’s pockets.  
 
Provide Temporary Aid To State and Local Governments 
The final part of  the program is a $25 billion temporary revenue sharing package for state and local 
governments to defray the impact of  projected revenue shortfalls due to the collapse of  the housing 
market and the slowing of  the economy. This sum can be divided into two portions, one of  which would 
be allocated to state governments based on standard-revenue sharing formulas that do not take into 
account the extent to which the state’s economy has been affected by the downturn. The second portion 
would be allocated to state governments in a way that is directly related to the economic hardship that the 
state is currently experiencing. Ideally, the second portion of  this package would be larger than the first, 
both because it would mean that the money is being directed to the areas where it is most needed and also 
because it would be spent most quickly in areas that are facing the most serious revenue shortfalls.  
  
This sum will not be sufficient to fully offset the lost revenue, but it will be helpful to the economy insofar 
as it prevents spending cuts or tax increases in the middle of  an economic downturn. If  the downturn 
proves to be deeper and more long-lasting than most economists now expect, this amount can be raised or 
expanded to include Medicaid matching funds at a later date. 
 
Total Spending Package 
 
Table 2 lists the key items included in the stimulus package and the proposed allocation for each one. 
 
TABLE 2  
Division of $140 Billion Stimulus Package 
Type of Stimulus Cost, in dollars 
Tax Cut $85 Billion 
Energy Conservation Tax Credit $20 Billion 
Public Transportation Subsidy $7 Billion 
Home Heating Oil Assistance $3 Billion 
Temporary Revenue Sharing $25 Billion 
Total $140 Billion 
 
Conclusion 
 
The U.S. economy is almost certainly headed into a recession in the very near future, if  a recession has not 
already begun, obviating the need to wait for a trigger before acting to offset the downturn. The main 
cause of  this downturn is the deflation of  an $8 trillion housing bubble. This collapse has already led to an 
enormous contraction in the housing sector. The loss of  housing wealth is likely to lead to an even larger 
reduction in consumption, which will push the economy into recession.  
 
The seriousness of  the situation is not generally appreciated because economists have an enormous bias 
against predicting recessions. This bias prevented the overwhelming majority of  economists from 
recognizing the 2001 recession until it was well underway. Similarly, Alan Greenspan and other prominent 
economist continued to tout the economy’s strength long after the 1990 recession had begun. Delaying a 
stimulus package could lead to a much longer and more severe downturn. 
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The stimulus package outlined here is intended to provide a modest boost to the economy. The targeted 
sum of  $140 billion may prove insufficient to prevent a recession if  house prices continue to fall 
precipitously, as is presently the case. However, it will help boost the economy and reduce the severity of  
the downturn while Congress has the opportunity to consider stronger measures.  
 
In a somewhat longer term framework, it would be desirable for Congress to take further steps to shorten 
the downturn and put the economy firmly on the path to economic and employment growth. The 
expansion and modernization of  unemployment insurance, already under discussion, would enable workers 
to better meet the challenges of  today’s economy.  The commitment of  additional resources to rebuilding 
the country’s infrastructure in ways that meet the environmental and economic demands of  the 21st 
century – by extending broadband Internet access to areas currently without service or building mass 
transit systems, for example – would meet an important need and could provide an important source of  
stimulus if  the downturn proves to be more long lasting than most economists currently anticipate.  This 
larger agenda cannot be addressed in the context of  a stimulus package that can be quickly enacted and put 
in place. However, it would be reasonable for Congress to begin now to consider a range of  programs that 
both meet the nation’s long-term needs and can provide the necessary stimulus to the economy should the 
downturn prove to be steeper or longer than currently anticipated. 
 
